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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-REVIEW OF LIQUOR AUTHORITY PRO-
CEEDINGS-VIOLATION OF O.P.A. CEILING PRICES AS CAUSE FOR
REVOCATION OF LICENSE.-In a hearing before the State Liquor Au-
thority in connection with proceedings to revoke petitioner-
respondent's wholesale liquor license, it was found that licensee sold
liquor at prices in excess of O.P.A. ceiling prices; that licensee and
one of its officers and two employees were convicted of these offenses;
that licensee violated Section 104, subdivision 10, of the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Law, in failing to keep on the premises adequate
books and records of all transactions, and Section 101-a, subdivi-
sion 2, of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, in making sales on
credit. The revocation proceedings ended in a determination by the
Liquor Authority for cancellation and surrender of the license. An
application for renewal of the license was denied by the Authority.
The Appellate Division annulled these determinations and remitted
the matter to the State Liquor Authority for consideration of the ap-
plication for the issuance of a license to the petitioner.1 The State
Liquor Authority appeals and also appeals separately from the order
of the Appellate Division with a stipulation by the Authority that,
upon affirmance of the order appealed from, order absolute might
be rendered against the Authority in favor of the petitioner. Held,
order reversed in part; otherwise first appeal and separate appeal
with stipulation for order absolute dismissed. Matter of Glenram
Wine & Liquor Corp. v. O'Connell, 295 N. Y. 336, 67 N. E. (2d)
570 (1946).
The Alcoholic Beverage Control Law gives the State Liquor
Authority broad discretionary power in the issuance and revocation
of liquor licenses.2 Subject to the laws of the state, the State Liquor
Authority alone must determine when it should give, withhold or
revoke its sanction, but its determination may be reviewed by the
courts.3 This discretionary power of the State Liquor Authority
will not be interfered with in the absence of proof that it has acted
arbitrarily.4
In the present case, six of the charges made against the petitioner
were for sales made during a prior licensing period in violation of
O.P.A. ceiling prices. The court states that in proper cases a li-
1 Glenram Wine & Liquor Corp. v. O'Connell, 269 App. Div. 1004, 58
N. Y. S. (2d) 475 (3d Dep't 1945).
2 N. Y. ALCOnOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW § 17.
3 N. Y. ALcoHoLIc BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW § 121; Matter of Yacht Club
Catering v. Bruckman, 276 N. Y. 44, 11 N. E. (2d) 345 (1937).
4 Commerce Development Corp. v. O'Connell, 58 N. Y. S. (2d) 97 (1945).
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cense may be suspended or revoked for acts occurring during a prior
licensing period, herein overruling the Appellate Division.5 The
Court of Appeals had ruled, however, in 1945, that, where the Liquor
Authority had, in conformity with the Alcoholic Beverage Control
Law, 6 provided the licensee with a list of the causes for which his
license could be revoked, and conviction for violation of O.P.A. ceil-
ing prices was not listed among those causes, revocation of a whole-
sale liquor license because of such conviction was without authority.7
The proceeding here under consideration began as a hearing to re-
voke the petitioner's license and ended with an order of cancellation.
This action, the court holds, was merely an attempt to avoid the
effect of the prior decision of the Court of Appeals in the Colonjol
case,8 and is to be considered as a revocation of the license. "Can-
cellation" is merely a form of revocation and the word is so used in
the statute and has been so understood by authority until this present
attempt to avoid the effect of the court's prior decision. 9 This ac-
tion, therefore, is to be considered as a revocation and, as in the
Colonial case,10 was without authority insofar as it was largely predi-
cated on the violation of the federal statute and such cause was not
listed among the reasons furnished the licensee as causes for
revocation."
There was sufficient evidence to sustain the finding that liquor
was sold on credit to one on the "delinquent list" and this would be
a violation of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law"2 which would
warrant a suspension of the petitioner's license. It does not appear,
however, that such sale was knowingly, wilfully or intentionally made
after receipt of the delinquent list, as required by the law,' 3 to make
the licensee subject to the penalty. Since there was proof of the
sales above ceiling prices and these sales were entered in the books
kept on the premises as sales at ceiling price, this is sufficient evi-
dence that the books kept by the licensee were inaccurate and inade-
quate, a violation of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law carrying
the penalty of forfeiture of the license.' 4 The court ruled that it had
no jurisdiction to review that part of the order of the Appellate
Division which ordered consideration of the application for issuance
of a new license, either on the appeal as of right or on the stipulation
5269 App. Div. 1004, 58 N. Y. S. (2d) 475 (1945).
6N. Y. ALcoHoLIc BEVERAGE CONTROL LAw § 114, subd. 5.
7 Colonial Liquor Distributors v. O'Connell, 295 N. Y. 129, 65 N. E. (2d)
745 (1946).8 Ibid.
9 N. Y. ALcoHoLic BERAGE CONTROL LAW § 119; Gelces v. State Liquor
Authority, 154 Misc. 517, 278 N. Y. Supp. 328 (1935).
20 295 N. Y. 129, 65 N. E. (2d) 745 (1946).
1 uN. Y. ALcoHOiuc BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW § 114, subd. 5.
12 N. Y. ALcoHoLic BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW § 101-A, subd. 2.
13 N. Y. ALcoHoLic BEVERAGE CONTROL LAw § 101-A, subd. 2.
14 N. Y. ALcoHoLic BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW § 104, subd. 10; N. Y. ALCO-
HoLic BEvERAGE CoNTROL LAtw § 101, subd. ic.
1946 ]
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for an order absolute, since the order appealed from did not finally
determine a special proceeding and does not come under the section
of the Constitution on which the appeal is based.15 Hearings are not
contemplated in connection with applications for the issuance of a
license. If a hearing is granted on application for a new license, it
is a matter of courtesy.16
M. J.S.
AUTOMOBILEs-LIABILITIES OF DEALERS FOR THE SALE OF
DEFECTIVE AUTOMOBILES TO THIRD PARTIES.-Defendant, a used
car dealer and proprietor of a repair shop, delivered a used car with
defective brakes into the possession of a prospective buyer for the
purpose of a trial run, without giving notice of such condition. The
prospective buyer, while exercising the highest degree of care, drove
the car onto the apron of one of plaintiff's service stations and be-
cause of the defective brakes ran into and demolished two gasoline
pumps for the value of which the plaintiff is now suing. The trial
court sustained a motion to dismiss the complaint.
Held, reversed and remanded. The duty of the defendant under
the facts pleaded was not confined to that of bailor and bailee, or
vendor and vendee, or any other such relationship, but rather is a
duty which arises out of the obligation that the law imposes on every
man to refrain from acts of commission or omission which he may
reasonably expect will result in injury to third persons. Standard
Oil Co. of Indiana v. Leaverton, - Mo. App. -, 192 S. W. (2d)
681 (1946).
Formerly it was the general rule that manufacturers or sellers
were not liable to third persons with whom they had no contractual
relationship in the use of their product, with the exception of those
things inherently dangerous.' This doctrine was later limited when
it was decided that whenever goods or machinery are supplied to
another for his use a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill as
to the condition of the thing supplied.2 In the leading case attaching
this liability to manufacturers of automobiles, it was said that al-
though automobiles are not inherently dangerous articles per se they
become akin to such when supplied in a dangerously defective con-
dition.3 A high degree of care was imposed on the maker because
any reasonably prudent man would know that such articles by their
25 N. Y. CoNsT. Art VI, § 7, subd. 3.
26 Usdane v. Bruckman, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 396 (1941).
'Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397 (1852).2 Devlin v. Smith et al., 89 N. Y. 470 (1882); Heaven v. Pender, 11Q. B. D. 503 (1883); Schubert v. J. R. Clark Co., 49 Minn. 331, 51 N. W.
1103 (1892).
3 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916).
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